I. INTRODUCTION
In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 1 the United States Supreme Court held that a Michigan sobriety checkpoint program was consistent with the requirements of the fourth amendment. 2 The Court, applying the balancing test announced in Brown v. Texas, 3 held that the state had a legitimate interest in preventing drunk driving, the sobriety checkpoint sufficiently advanced the public interest, and the intrusion on individual motorists was slight. 4 This Note argues that Chief Justice Rehnquist, who wrote the majority opinion for the Court, correctly applied the Brown balancing test. Specifically, this Note argues that the Michigan sobriety checkpoint program was sufficiently effective to advance the public interest. The arrest rate realized with the Michigan program compares very favorably with the arrest rate of the border checkpoint upheld by the Supreme Court in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte. 5 Moreover, the Court understated the effectiveness of the sobriety checkpoint program by undervaluing its deterrent effect. This Note further concludes that the checkpoint's intrusion on individual liberty is slight and indistinguishable from the intrusion upheld in Martinez-Fuerte.
This Note also contends that Justice Brennan, in his dissent, incorrectly demanded an individualized suspicion requirement. Such a requirement was abandoned when the Court upheld the bor-Under the guidelines, checkpoints were to be set up at selected sites along state roads. 8 All vehicles passing through a checkpoint were to be stopped and their drivers briefly examined for indications of intoxication. 9 If a checkpoint officer detected signs of intoxication, then the officer was to direct the motorist to a designated location out of the traffic flow where another officer examined the motorist's driver's license and car registration. 1 0 If the field tests and the officer's observations indicated that the motorist was intoxicated, then the officer was to arrest the motorist. 1 Motorists who showed no signs of intoxication were allowed to continue on their way immediately. 12 The Saginaw County Sheriff's Department carried out the only sobriety checkpoint conducted under the program prior to the Supreme Court decision. 1 3 The entire operation lasted one hour and fifteen minutes, during which time one hundred twenty-six vehicles passed through the checkpoint. 1 4 The checkpoint officers detained two drivers for further field sobriety testing, one of whom was subsequently arrested for driving under the influence of alco-hol. 15 On the day before the operation of the Saginaw County checkpoint, respondents 16 filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief from potential subjection to the checkpoints in the Circuit Court of Wayne County.
17

B. HISTORY OF FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION AGAINST SEARCHES AND SEIZURES OF INDIVIDUALS IN AUTOMOBILES
The Supreme Court has indicated that an individual in an automobile is not entided to the same level of privacy as an individual in the home.' 8 The Court has held that stopping a vehicle and detaining its occupants is a "seizure" within the meaning of the fourth amendment. 1 9 Yet, it has also held that a stop and seizure of a moving automobile can be made without a warrant. 2 0 However, the Court noted in United States v. Almeida-Sanchez that roving patrol searches of vehicles required consent or probable cause to be "reasonable" under the fourth amendment.
2 1
The Court extended the rule announced in Almeida-Sanchez two years later in United States v. Ortiz. 22 Although the Court required consent or probable cause under the facts of Almeida-Sanchez, it also indicated that a different standard might apply if the vehicle inspec- 15 Id. An officer in an observation vehicle pulled over a third motorist who drove through the checkpoint without stopping. The officer subsequently arrested the motorist for driving under the influence of alcohol. Id. 16 The respondents were "licensed drivers of tion was for a purpose other than discovering illegal aliens. 28 The Supreme Court first dealt with the use of roadblocks as a police enforcement technique in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce. 24 In Brignoni-Ponce, two border patrol officers on roving patrol decided to stop a vehicle to determine if it was transporting illegal aliens.
5
The Court held that although probable cause was not necessary for such a stop, the border patrol officers could not arbitrarily stop motorists.
6
In Delaware v. Prouse, 2 7 the Court dealt with a situation similar to that in Brignoni-Ponce. 28 In Prouse, the police stopped a vehicle and detained its driver to check the driver's license and vehicle registration. 2 9 The Court held that a roving patrol officer needed "articulable and reasonable suspicion" before he was permitted to stop an automobile and detain the driver to check his driver ' The Michigan Department of State Police appealed the trial court's decision, claiming the court erred in finding that the sobriety checkpoint program did not significantly further the public interest in curbing drunk driving and that it subjectively intruded on individual liberties. 3 9 The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, concluding that the trial court's findings were not clearly erroneous. 40 The court of appeals agreed with the trial court that the Brown balancing test was the correct test to determine the constitutionality of the sobriety checkpoint program. 4 1 While the court of appeals acknowledged that the state had a "serious and legitimate interest in curbing drunk driving," 42 it could not find dearly erroneous the trial court's findings that sobriety checkpoints were not an effective means of combating drunk driving 43 and that they subjectively intruded on individual liberties. 44 The Michigan Supreme Court denied the petitioners' application for leave to appeal, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
40
Id. at 440-41, 429 N.W.2d at 183. The Court of Appeals noted that the findings of fact by the trial court could not be set aside unless they were found to be dearly erroneous. Id. at 440, 429 N.W.2d at 183 (citation omitted). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous "when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire record is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Id. (citation omitted). 41 
III. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. MAJORITY OPINION
Writing for the majority, 4 6 Chief Justice Rehnquist initially asserted that Martinez-Fuerte 4 7 and Brown 48 were the relevant authorities for the case at hand. 4 9 Recognizing that a fourth amendment "seizure" occurs whenever a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint, 50 the Chief Justice concluded that the relevant question thus became whether such a seizure is "reasonable" under the fourth amendment. 51 Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the instant action only challenged the use of sobriety checkpoints generally; therefore, the Court needed to address only the initial stop of each motorist passing through a checkpoint and the associated preliminary questioning and observation by the checkpoint officers. 55 Id. at 2486. ChiefJustice Rehnquist based this conclusion on the Court's finding in Martinez-Fuerte that the objective intrusion was slight for a motorist subjected to a brief stop at a highway checkpoint for illegal aliens. Michigan Dep' of State Police, 110 S. Ct. at 2486 (citing Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558). ChiefJustice Rehnquist found no difference between the levels of intrusion on motorists stopped at a sobriety checkpoint or a highway checkpoint for illegal aliens, noting that the stops seem identical to the lawabiding motorist, except for the nature of the questions asked by the checkpoint officers.
Id.
Rehnquist, however, did not agree with the Court of Appeals' determination that the "subjective" intrusion 56 on motorists was substantial. 5 7 He pointed to the Court's decision in Martinez-Fuerte, 58 noting that the intrusion resulting from the sobriety checkpoint stop was indistinguishable for constitutional purposes from the checkpoint stops that the Court had upheld in Martinez-Fuerte. 59 Chief Justice Rehnquist next concluded that the Court of Appeals erred in determining that the sobriety checkpoint program failed the "effectiveness" prong of the Brown balancing test. 6 0 He argued that the language from Brown indicated that an evaluation of the effectiveness of a law enforcement practice "was not meant to transfer from politically accountable officials to the courts the decision as to which among reasonable alternative law enforcement techniques should be employed to deal with a serious public danger." 6 ' ChiefJustice Rehnquist pointed out that of the one hundred twenty-six vehicles detained during the operation of the Saginaw County checkpoint program, two drunk drivers were arrested. ChiefJustice Rehnquist noted that the 1.5 percent arrest rate for the Saginaw County sobriety checkpoint program compared very favorably to the 0.5 percent detection rate of illegal aliens hidden in vehicles stopped in Martinez-Fuerte. 63 Accordingly, the Chief Justice could see nojustification for reaching a different result in the instant 56 A subjective intrusion generates concern or even fright on the part of lawful travelers. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558.
57 Michigan Dep't of State Police, 110 S. Ct. at 2486. ChiefJustice Rehnquist pointed out that the Court of Appeals had agreed with the trial court's conclusion that the checkpoints had the potential to generate fear and surprise in motorists, because the record failed to show that approaching motorists would be aware of the option to make U-turns or turnoffs to avoid the checkpoints. Id. Thus, the Court of Appeals determined that the subjective intrusion from the checkpoint was unreasonable. 
64
In conclusion, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that "the balance of the State's interest in preventing drunken driving, the extent to which this system can reasonably be said to advance that interest, and the degree of intrusion upon individual motorists who are briefly stopped, weighs in favor of the state program." 6 5 Accordingly, the Chief Justice held that the sobriety checkpoint program was consistent with the fourth amendment and reversed the decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals. Justice Brennan criticized the majority for creating the impression that the Court usually engaged in a balancing test to determine the constitutionality of all seizures, notably those relating to police stops of motorists on public highways. 68 Justice Brennan pointed out that in most cases, the police must possess probable cause for a search to be held reasonable. 69 He noted that only when a seizure is "substantially less intrusive" 70 than a typical police arrest is the balancing test appropriate. 7 1
Justice Brennan agreed with the majority that an initial stop of a car at a checkpoint under the Michigan State Police sobriety checkpoint policy was sufficiently less intrusive than an arrest to allow the reasonableness of this seizure to be determined through the balanc- in favor of protecting the public against even the "minimally intrusive" seizures involved in this case. 78
C. JUSTICE STEVENS' DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Stevens, joined in part by Justices Brennan and Marshall, 7 9 dissented, arguing that the "net effect of sobriety checkpoints on traffic safety [is] infinitesimal and possibly negative." 80 Justice Stevens argued that a higher arrest rate could have been achieved using more conventional means, adding that a Maryland study conducted over several years showed that of 41,000 motorists passing through sobriety checkpoints, only 143 persons were arrested. 81 Justice Stevens also argued that little if any relationship existed between sobriety checkpoints and a reduction in the number of highway fatalities, pointing to a Maryland study comparing a county using sobriety checkpoints and a control county. 82 , J., dissenting) . The results of the study showed that alcohol related accidents decreased by 10% in the checkpoint county and by 11% in the control county. Fatal accidents in the control county fell from 16 to 3, while fatal accidents in the check-upon this evidence, Justice Stevens noted that the Court had misapplied the Brown balancing test by overvaluing the law enforcement interest in using sobriety checkpoints and undervaluing the individual's interest in freedom from random, unannounced investigatory seizures. 8 3 Justice Stevens argued in Part I of his dissent that the sobriety checkpoints in the instant case were not analogous to the border stops upheld by this Court in Martinez-Fuerte. 8 4 Initially, Justice Stevens argued that since the border stops were fixed, a motorist had the opportunity to avoid the search, while no such opportunity was available in the case of the temporary sobriety checkpoint. 8 5 The degree of surprise and fear inherent in the temporary sobriety checkpoints, argued Justice Stevens, distinguished them from the border stops in Martinez-Fuerte and made them more intrusive. 8 6 Justice Stevens also distinguished the border stops upheld in Martinez-Fuerte and the sobriety checkpoint in the present case with respect to the degree of discretion exercised by police officers. Justice Stevens pointed out that with a permanent checkpoint, there is no room for discretion in either the timing or the location of the stop. 8 8 Yet, with temporary sobriety checkpoints, Justice Stevens argued that police officers would exercise "extremely broad discretion in determining the exact timing and placement of the roadblock." 8 9 In Part II of his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens criticized the Court's determination regarding the degree to which the sobriety checkpoints advanced the public interest. 90 Justice Stevens pointed point county actually doubled from the prior year. Id. at 2491-92 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 83 Id. at 2492 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 84 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens conceded that "a border search, or indeed any search at a permanent and fixed checkpoint, [is] much less intrusive than a random stop." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). However, he argued that the sobriety checkpoint was analogous to the random investigative stops that the Court held unconstitutional in Brignoni-Ponce and Prouse and not to the border stop upheld in Martinez-Fuerte. Id. at 2493 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 85 Id. at 2492 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 86 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 87 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 88 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) . 89 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). Justice Stevens also argued that a check for a driver's license or for identification papers at an immigration checkpoint was much more readily standardized than a search for signs of intoxication at a sobriety checkpoint. He asserted that a Michigan officer at a sobriety checkpoint had unlimited discretion to detain a motorist on the basis of the slightest suspicion. Id. at 2493 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
90 Id. at 2495 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens argued that immigration stops were necessary because transporting illegal aliens did not necessarily impair a motorist's driving ability. As such, an officer could not detect a smuggler simply by observing his out that there was "a complete failure of proof on the question whether the wholesale seizures have produced any net advance in the public interest in arresting intoxicated drivers." 9 1
Justice Stevens, in Part III of his dissenting opinion, criticized the Court for giving no weight to the citizen's interest in being free from unannounced suspicionless seizures. 9 2 Justice Stevens argued that sobriety checkpoints are "elaborate, and disquieting, publicity stunts." 9 3 Justice Stevens suggested that the case was driven by symbolic state action, which he argued was "an insufficient justification for an otherwise unreasonable program of random seizures." 
IV. ANALYSIS
A. CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST'S CORRECT APPLICATION OF THE
BROWN BALANCING TEST
An evaluation of the strength of the majority's opinion turns on an analysis of ChiefJustice Rehnquist's application of the Brown balancing test. 9 5 Initially, the Chief Justice correctly emphasized the grave public concern with the nation's drunk driving problem, finding that this weighed heavily in favor of upholding the sobriety checkpoint program. 96 driving ability. On the other hand,Justice Stevens argued that an officer could detect an intoxicated motorist without a sobriety checkpoint by observing his or her driving ability, since if intoxication did not affect driving ability it would not be illegal to drive while intoxicated. Accordingly, Justice Stevens argued that sobriety checkpoints did not advance the public interest to the extent that immigration stops did. Id. at 2496-97 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91 Id. at 2495 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 92 Id. at 2497 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 93 Id. at 2498 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 94 Id. at 2499 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 95 According to the Court in Brown, the determination of the constitutionality of a seizure less intrusive than a traditional arrest "involves a weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty." Brown v. Relying on data pertinent to the Michigan sobriety checkpoint program, ChiefJustice Rehnquist properly argued that the Michigan program was sufficiently "effective" to advance the public interest under the second prong of the Brown balancing test. Justice Stevens, however, erred in his analysis of the program's effectiveness, because he incorrectly focused on the low arrest rate achieved under an older Maryland program; Justice Stevens relied on the Maryland results to demonstrate that the Michigan sobriety checkpoint program was not an effective means of combatting drunk driving. 9 7 In so doing, he ignored the fact that the 1.5 percent arrest rate realized under the Michigan program 98 compared very favorably with the 0.5 percent arrest rate realized in one of the border stops upheld in Martinez-Fuerte. 99 In Martinez-Fuerte, the Court concluded that the "record... provides a rather complete picture of the effectiveness of the San Clemente checkpoint." cupation with the arrest rate is curious. Intuitively, a low arrest rate should not necessarily constitute evidence of ineffectiveness, especially when the ultimate goal of the program is to keep drunk drivers off the highway. Logically, if the checkpoint program successfully deterred drunk drivers from taking to the highways, there would be fewer drunk drivers to arrest. Accordingly, a low arrest rate at a checkpoint may constitute evidence that the program is successfully keeping drunk drivers off the roads.
98 See supra text accompanying notes 14-15 and 63. 99 The record in one of the consolidated cases in Martinez-Fuerte indicated that of the 146,000 vehicles passing through the checkpoint, 820 were referred to a secondary inspection area where border officers discovered 725 illegal aliens in 171 vehicles. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976).
occurrence furnishes an ample justification for reasonable searches calculated to advance the Government's goal.
3
The Court in Von Raab analogized the drug testing program to the search of all passengers boarding commercial airlines, 1°4 and concluded that "[w]hen the Government's interest lies in deterring highly hazardous conduct, a low incidence of such conduct, far from impugning the validity the scheme for implementing this interest, is more logically viewed as a hallmark of success."' 0 5
Furthermore, when proving the effectiveness of the sobriety checkpoint program, the Michigan Department of State Police did not need to show the checkpoint was the only practical alternative.
1 0 6 Accordingly, Justice Stevens inappropriately evaluated the effectiveness of the checkpoint program in comparison to other potential police procedures when he argued that a higher arrest rate could have been achieved through use of more conventional police techniques.' 0 7 Such an approach "violates the principle that such less-restrictive-alternative arguments are inapplicable in the search and seizure context."' 0 8 In fact, the Supreme Court rejected a lessrestrictive-alternative argument in Martinez-Fuerte when it argued that "[t]he logic of such elaborate less-restrictive-alternative arguments could raise insuperable barriers to the exercise of virtually all search-and-seizure powers."' 1 9 More recently, in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association,' 1 o the Court again rejected the "less-restrictive-alternative" analysis when it noted that:
We (1988) . Dr. Ross testified that while studies showed a short-term deterrent effect resulting from various programs against drunk driving, the statistics eventually returned to normal. Ross' explanation for this result was that the initial publicity led people to think that the chances of being caught were high. Ross argued that once people learned of the low arrest rate, their behavior would return to normal. Id.
113 Id. However, this does not necessarily make intuitive sense. Consider the case of airline passenger searches. Although only approximately 0.0002% of all airline passengers are arrested for carrying illegal firearms, see supra note 104, it is doubtful that anyone would argue that the low arrest rate corresponds with little or no deterrence value. Airline passengers considering whether or not to transport firearms are deterred by the fact that they must pass through a search point, not by the knowledge that only 42,000 firearms were discovered out of 19.5 billion searches of passengers. Similarly, an intoxicated individual deciding whether or not to drive is not concerned with the percentage of individuals arrested who pass through a sobriety checkpoint. Rather, an intoxicated individual is more concerned with whether or not she will have to pass through a checkpoint. If not, she may determine that she can drive carefully enough to avoid drawing attention to herself, subjecting all others on the road to great danger. However, with the prospect of passing through a checkpoint, the individual may not be able to avoid scrutiny regardless of how carefully she thinks she can drive. As such, she will be less likely to take to the roads. In accordance with the Brown test, ChiefJustice Rehnquist next weighed the severity of the drunk driving problem and the interest served by the checkpoint program against the severity of the intrusion on individual liberty. The Chief Justice correctly concluded that the severity of the intrusion was slight and that the balancing of interests weighed in favor of the constitutionality of the sobriety checkpoint program." 8 Chief Justice Rehnquist agreed with the trial court and the Michigan Court of Appeals that the objective intrusion was slight since motorists were stopped only very briefly at the checkpoint." 19 However, the Chief Justice disagreed with trial court's and the Michigan Court of Appeals' holding that the subjective intrusion was substantial. 120 He appropriately argued that the lower court's had exaggerated the degree of fear and surprise generated by a checkpoint. This same criticism is applicable to Justice Stevens, who was also preoccupied with the potential fear and surprise associated with a sobriety checkpoint. Justice Stevens' argument that the subjective intrusion from such a checkpoint was substantial 12 2 ignored the Court's decisions in Martinez-Fuerte and Ortiz. 12 3 In Martinez-Fuerte, the Court commented that "the subjective intrusion-the generating of concern or even fright on the part of lawful travelers- appreciably less in the case of a checkpoint stop."' 1 2 4 In Ortiz, the Court also argued that checkpoint stops were far less intrusive than roving patrols. 125 Both decisions are instructive, because the checkpoints which the Court found less intrusive than the border stops closely resemble the sobriety checkpoint at issue here. As with the traffic checkpoint in Ortiz, the checkpoint here is such that a motorist can see that the police are stopping other vehicles as well as other visible signs of the officers' authority. As Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted, the sobriety checkpoint at issue here was not more subjectively intrusive, and thus was no different for constitutional purposes than the border stop in Martinez-Fuerte. 126 Therefore, the Chief Justice correctly applied the Brown balancing test when he noted that "the balance of the State's interest in preventing drunk driving, the extent to which this system can reasonably be said to advance that interest, and the degree of intrusion upon individual motorists who are briefly stopped, weighs in favor of the state program." Both the border stops and the sobriety checkpoint involved very brief stops, a short period of questioning, and the channeling of suspicious motorists to a secondary investigation area. As such, Chief Justice Rehnquist correctly argued that both stops would seem identical to the average motorist except for "the nature of the questions the checkpoint officers might ask."' 3 2
Justice Brennan also argued that even if the two programs were comparable, this did not permit the abandoning of the individualized suspicion requirement in this case.1 33 He stated that there was no justification for a suspicionless seizure in the instant case, since drunk drivers could be detected without the use of a sobriety checkpoint.' 34 However, the Court in Martinez-Fuerte also justified abandoning the individualized suspicion requirement upon the perception that "such a requirement would largely eliminate any deterrent to the conduct of well-disguised smuggling operations."'
The same argument applies to a sobriety checkpoint. The requirement of individualized suspicion in the instant case eliminates any deterrent effect upon the intoxicated individual who believes he or she can drive carefully enough to avoid drawing attention to himself or herself. Without the individualized suspicion requirement, the intoxicated individual faces the chance of being stopped despite how carefully he or she is able to drive. Therefore, Justice Stevens incorrectly distinguished the sobriety checkpoint from the border stop in Martinez-Fuerte to arrive at the conclusion that the sobriety checkpoint violated the individualized suspicion requirement.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court's decision upholding'a sobriety checkpoint program paves the way for law enforcement officials to implement a promising technique for combating drunk driving. Importantly, the Court accomplished this task without a radical departure from fourth amendment jurisprudence. Rather, the Court arrived at its decision through a consistent application of the case law on automobile searches and seizures.
The Court correctly applied the balancing test enunciated in Brown and properly held that the equities weighed in favor of upholding the constitutionality of the Michigan sobriety checkpoint 132 Id. at 2486.
133 Id. at 2489 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan argued that in Martinez-Fuerie, the suspicionless stops were justified because the traffic flow was too heavy to allow a particularized study of individual vehicles. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) . 
